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INTRODUCTION 
Patents on many blockbuster drugs will expire in the near 
future, opening up the doorways for generic production.1  Brand-
name drug companies lose an estimated half of their U.S. sales 
during the first six months of generic production alone.2  In an effort 
to forestall large sales declines, some brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies are scrambling to delay generic production.  One 
measure brand-name pharmaceutical companies often take to extend 
their monopolies is patenting additional features of the drug 
products or purified forms of the drugs.3  A patent gives a 
pharmaceutical company the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the 
patented drug for twenty years.4  When the patent expires generic 
companies are free to market the same drug, creating competition in 
the marketplace and lowering prices. 
Although antitrust law prohibits anti-competitive behavior, 
patents are an exception to the rule against monopolies.5  Patent 
holders are given a legally enforceable monopoly for the twenty-year 
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 1 National Institute for Health Care Management Issue Brief, Prescription Drugs 
and Intellectual Property Protection, available at http://www.nihcm.org (Aug. 2000) (on 
file with the author) [hereinafter NIHCM Issue Brief]. 
 2 Gardiner Harris & Chris Adams, Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That 
Slow Generics, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2001, at A1. 
 3 See infra PART IV for further discussion. 
 4 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). 
 5 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 
(1965) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 816 (1945)).  Patents provide great public benefits by encouraging investment 
in innovation, but patents also provide antitrust concerns.  David A. Balto, 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD DRUG L.J. 321, 327 
(2000). 
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life of the patent.6  A patent holder, however, may violate antitrust 
laws when the patent is used to obtain increased market power 
beyond that intended by Congress.7  Despite the perceived conflict 
between patent and antirust law, the two areas are truly 
complementary.8  Both are directed towards the promotion of 
innovation, enterprise, and competition.9  Patents provide incentives 
for pharmaceutical companies to create new drugs because the 
absence of competition during the patent period allows 
pharmaceutical companies to charge high prices.10 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) recently took action 
against a series of agreements between brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies and generic manufacturers that sought to use the Hatch-
Waxman Act11 180-day exclusivity provision to block the entrance of 
other generic manufacturers into the market.12  Generic 
 
 6 Melissa K. Davis, Note and Comment, Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand-Name 
Drug Companies In the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L. & COM. 357, 361-62 (1995). 
 7 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
1111 (2d ed. 2001). 
 8 Anne K. Bingaman, Address at the Federal Circuit Judicial Conference 
(transcript), available at http: //www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeeches/94-06-16.txt 
(July 15, 1994) (on file with the author). 
 9 Id. 
 10 ABC NEWS: Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profits and the Public Health, ABC TELEVISION 
BROAD., May 29, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File [hereinafter Bitter 
Medicine]. 
 11 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002). 
 12 James Langenfeld, Antitrust: New Economy, New Regime Second Annual Symposium 
of the American Antitrust Institute: Intellectual Property And Antitrust: Steps Toward Striking 
A Balance, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 105 (2001).  The FTC recently challenged 
three agreements between brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generic drug 
manufacturers where the brand-name company paid the generic manufacturer to 
delay entry into the market.  The Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement Before 
the Committee On the Judiciary United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm (May 24, 2001) (on file with the author). 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic manufacturers are given incentive to 
challenge a patent holder by awarding the first generic manufacturer to submit an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), a 180-day exclusivity period whereby it 
is protected from competition by subsequent generic applicants.  21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994).  The period does not begin until either the generic 
manufacturer markets the drug, or when a court renders a decision holding the 
patent invalid or not infringed.  Id.  Thus, if a brand-name company and the first 
generic company to file an ANDA settle a patent dispute and enter into an 
agreement to forestall generic production, other generic manufacturers are 
prevented from marketing their generic versions indefinitely.  The Federal Trade 
Commission, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharm 
testimony.htm#N_39_ (April 23, 2002) (on file with the author).  The Greater Access 
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act (GAAP), however, which was passed in the Senate 
on July 31, 2002, would amend the Hatch-Waxman Act so that generic and brand-
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manufacturers, Congress, and the public have accused brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies of attempting to forestall generics from 
entering the market by filing frivolous drug patents, a practice the 
FTC has recently begun to review.13 
The pharmaceutical industry is the most profitable industry in 
the country, with the top ten companies earning more than thirty-
seven billion dollars in profits in 2001.14  Although pharmaceutical 
companies’ earnings are high, one study indicates that it costs an 
average of eight hundred million dollars to get one new drug to the 
market.15  Thus, it is not difficult to see why pharmaceutical 
companies want to hold on to their monopolies on profit-producing 
drugs. 
This Comment examines patent prosecution tactics used by 
brand-name pharmaceutical corporations to extend their drug 
monopolies and discusses whether these tactics rise to the level of 
antitrust violations.  Part I provides an overview of patent law in the 
pharmaceutical industry and the role of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Part 
II provides a general overview of antitrust law.  Part III describes the 
patent prosecution tactics used by some brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies to extend their monopolies.  Specifically, Part III.A 
describes the approach of patenting metabolites16 created by the 
 
name companies that enter into agreements to keep the generics off the market, will 
not prohibit other generic companies from marketing the drug.  S. Res. 812, 107th 
Cong. (2002) (enacted).  One of the Act’s purposes is “to ensure fair marketplace 
practices and deter pharmaceutical companies (including generic companies) from 
engaging in anticompetitive action or actions that tend to unfairly restrain trade.”  
Id. 
 13 In February 2001, the FTC announced its intention to collect information 
about brand-name pharmaceutical companies’ orange book listings to investigate 
generic competition development under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Federal Trade 
Commission Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission for OMB Review; 
Comment Request, 66 Fed. Reg. 12512 (Feb. 27, 2001).  To date no action has been 
taken against the pharmaceutical industry for frivolous patent listings.  Id.  This study 
will provide the FTC with information about “concerns that manufacturers of 
pioneer drugs are listing additional patents shortly before the expiration of 
previously listed patents . . . .”  The Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement 
Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm (May 24, 2001) (on file with the author). 
 14 Bitter Medicine, supra note 10. 
 15 Id.  Tufts University found that it costs $800 million in drug development to 
get one new drug on the market.  Id.  However, pharmaceutical industry critics argue 
that the drug companies have yet to reveal any detailed reports of their research 
costs and that this number is used by the pharmaceutical industry for political 
purposes.  Id. 
 16 Metabolites are molecules that are formed in the body from the breakdown of 
an ingested drug.  Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (2001). 
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breakdown of a drug in the body.17  Part III.B explains the approach 
of double patenting drugs.18  Part III.C describes the approach of 
patenting polymorphic forms of already patented drugs.19 
This Comment concludes that brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies are likely to be immune from Sherman Act Section 2 
claims under the Noerr-Immunity doctrine, even if their intent was to 
extend the scope of their monopolies through patent evergreening.20  
This Comment recommends both legislative changes to the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the institution of guidelines for listing a patent in 
the Orange Book.21  This Comment calls for review of both the 
protection the Federal Circuit22 gives patent holders and the Patent 
and Trademark Office’s procedures. 
I.  PATENT LAW IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT 
 For the past twenty years, the pharmaceutical industry has been 
the most lucrative industry in the United States, due in part to its 
power to control prices derived from intellectual property 
protection.23  Prescription drug sales have increased dramatically in 
recent years.24  In 2000, prescription drug expenditures in the United 
States were over $130 billion, representing an almost twenty percent 
 
 17 The patenting of metabolites is one method that has been used by some 
pharmaceutical companies to extend the lives of their exclusivity periods.  Id. 
 18 The practice of double patenting involves obtaining multiple patents on one 
single compound where the two patents are not distinct.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (2001). 
 19 Some drug compounds exist in multiple forms called polymorphs.  
Pharmaceutical companies have been successful in patenting different polymorphic 
forms of certain drugs.  See Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562 (1997). 
 20 Evergreening is the strategy of obtaining additional patents on specific features 
of a drug product or a purified form of the drug to extend the monopoly on a drug 
when the patent is close to expiration.  NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1. 
 21 The Orange Book, or the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations, lists all FDA approved drugs and their related patents.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994). 
 22 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was created in 1982 as a 
forum for patent appeals to reduce patent litigation forum shopping.  CHISUM ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 24-25.  The court has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals set 
forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).  Id. at 25.  The court consists of twelve 
circuit judges.  Id. at 26. 
 23 NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1. 
 24 National Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational 
Foundation, Prescription Drug Expenditures In 2000: The Upward Trend Continues (2000), 
available at http://www.nihcm.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (on file with the 
author). 
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increase from 1999.25  In light of this rapid rise in prescription drug 
expenditures, there is renewed public attention on patent laws, drug 
regulations, and the tactics employed by brand-name drug companies 
to forestall generic drug entry into the market.26 
The United States Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
authorizes Congress to grant patents.27  A patent provides a monopoly 
in an invention for a limited period of time, including the exclusive 
rights to make, use, and sell the invention.28  Thus, patents are an 
exception to the rule against monopolies29 and to the right to a free 
and open market.30  A United States patentee receives a patent for 
twenty years from the date of filing.31  Once granted, a patent 
provides the patent holder with the right to exclude others from 
using the invention.32  Anyone who “without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States 
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the 
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”33 
Patents provide great incentive for brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies to conduct research because patent rights eliminate 
competition during the patent period, enabling patent holders to 
charge a premium for their drugs.34  Because of the high costs of 
research and development, the pharmaceutical industry views patents 
as an especially important form of motivation.35  Thus, it is 
advantageous for a pharmaceutical company to obtain as many 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts by securing for times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”).  The Supreme 
Court explained the purpose of patents as public franchises given to inventors as 
compensation for their time and expense in creating new and useful improvements 
for the benefit of the public.  Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870). 
 28 Davis, supra note 6, at 361-62. 
 29 Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that “every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”  15 
U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
 30 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 
(1965) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 816 (1945)). 
 31 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).  The patent gives its owner a monopoly on the 
invention that expires twenty years from the date of the patent application.  Id. 
 32 Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945). 
 33 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). 
 34 See NIHCM, supra note 1. 
 35 Evan Ackiron, The Human Genome Initiative and the Impact of Genetic Testing and 
Screening Technologies: Note and Comment: Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT 
Case, 17 AM. J.L. MED. 145, 149 (1991). 
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patents as possible.  Patent holders can obtain numerous patents on a 
single drug including: formulation, composition, methods of 
manufacture, and method of use patents.36  A patent holder may 
increase the term of its monopoly by filing additional patents at a 
time later than the original filing.37 
To obtain a patent, the inventor must file an application with the 
Patent Office.38  The applicant must claim that the invention is novel, 
useful, and nonobvious.39  Although the patent process is ex parte, a 
patent has a presumption of validity.40  As a protection, applicants 
have the duty of absolute candor to the Patent Office and must 
disclose all material information.41  Absolute candor requires, 
however, only that applicants provide the Patent Office with prior 
art42 of which they have knowledge.43  There is no affirmative duty to 
research and supply additional information.44  Further, reviews of 
 
 36 Terry G. Mahn, Symposium Issue - Striking The Right Balance Between Innovation 
And Drug Price Competition: Understanding The Hatch-Waxman Act: The Hatch-Waxman 
Act During Patent Prosecution and Beyond, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 233, 234 (1999). 
 37 See id.  “If there are multiple NCEs [new chemical entities] developed during 
the drug development stage, the patent strategy should be to file for separate patents 
for each NCE.”  Id. at 234.  New chemical entities include isomers, crystalline forms, 
metabolites, and polymorphs.  Id. 
 38 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).  The Patent Office has the power to grant patents 
pursuant to the Patent Act.  Id.  The Patent Office is officially known as the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO). 
 39 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988). 
 40 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).  The only participants in patent prosecution are the 
applicant and the patent examiner.  Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (2001). 
 41 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1988). 
 42 “Prior art is the set of circumstances set forth in [35 U.S.C. §102] AND 
NOTHING MORE.  Prior art may be an act—an offer for sale, a use, and a prior 
invention – or it may be a document—a prior foreign patent or publication, or it may 
be a U.S. patent.” PLI’S EXAM FOCUS PATENT BAR REVIEW, STUDY GUIDE (2002) 
(emphasis in original).  35 U.S.C. section 103 provides that “[a] patent may not be 
obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in 
section 102 of this title if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 103.  Section 102 (a), (e), and (g) are the prior art 
subsections.  Application of Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (1973).  Section 102 provides 
that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(a) the invention was known . . . 
by others . . . or described in a printed publication . . . before the invention by the 
applicant, or (e) the invention was described in- (1) an application for patent, or (2) 
a patent granted on an application for patent” or (g) another inventor establishes 
that the invention was made by the other inventor.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). 
 43 Lemley, supra note 40, at 1499-1500.  The examiner has the responsibility of 
reviewing the application and researching the prior art to decide whether the claims 
in the patent application should be rejected.  Id. 
 44 Id. 
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patent applications are not extensive.45 The examiner only spends an 
average total of eighteen hours over the course of the two to three 
year prosecution of each application.46 As such, examiners often 
overlook the most relevant prior art.47  The result is that many of the 
patents issued would have been rejected if given greater review.48  
Further, a large percentage of patents that are eventually litigated to 
judgment are invalidated.49 
Pharmaceutical research typically involves years of experiments 
in human cell models and in animals prior to human 
experimentation.50  If this extensive preclinical research is successful, 
the company files an Investigational New Drug application (“IND”) 
with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) requesting approval 
to initiate human experiments.51  Pharmaceutical companies 
generally file patents during preclinical testing52 of the drug, prior to 
the filing of an IND with the FDA.53  If the company deems a drug to 
be safe and efficacious after clinical trials, a New Drug Application 
(NDA) is filed with the FDA requesting approval to market the drug.54  
The NDA must contain the drug’s safety and effectiveness data, 
information on the manufacturing process; and information on 
packaging, labeling and marketing of the drug.55  The NDA must also 
include a list of all the patents covering the pioneer drug that might 
be infringed if a generic drug was marketed prior to the patent 
 
 45 Id. at 1500. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 1528. 
 48 Lemley, supra note 40, at 1528.  A more comprehensive examination process 
might deter the filing of some frivolous applications because of the increased 
likelihood that it would be rejected.  Id. at 1508. 
 49 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N  Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). 
 50 William M. Brown, A “Highly Artificial Act of Infringement,” Indeed, But It Can Still 
Cost You Attorneys’ Fees . . . Comment on Yamanouchi v. Danbury, 33 UWLA L. REV. 117, 
124 (2001). 
 51 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Symposium Issue - Striking The Right Balance Between 
Innovation And Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 
187, 192 (1999). 
 52 Preclinical testing involves assessing a drug’s potential utility in animal models 
and in vitro assays.  Brown, supra note 50, at 125.  If the drug is determined to be safe 
and efficacious during preclinical testing the drug is then tested in humans.  Id. 
Testing in humans is called clinical trials.  Id.  If testing in humans shows the drug is 
safe and efficacious, a new drug application is made to the FDA.  Id. 
 53 Mossinghoff, supra note 51, at 192. 
 54 Brown, supra note 50, at 125. 
 55 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (c)(2) (1994). 
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expiration.56  If the FDA approves the NDA, all the patents on the 
drug that are listed in the NDA will be published in the Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, also known 
as the Orange Book.57  The FDA does not make an independent 
determination as to whether the patents listed in the NDA actually 
cover the pioneer drug, but instead relies on a signed declaration 
from the applicant.58 
Generally, the patent is issued years before FDA approval of the 
drug.59  However, under the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
also known as the Hatch- Waxman Act Amendments to the Federal 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, the patent holder can apply for an 
extension on the patent term to regain time that was lost in 
regulatory review of the drug.60 
Generic companies duplicate pioneer prescription drugs by 
using the same active ingredients found in the pioneer drugs but with 
different inactive ingredients.61  The Hatch-Waxman Act governs FDA 
approval of generic drugs.62  If the generic drug is the bioequivalent63 
 
 56 Brown, supra note 50, at 125. 
 57 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (1994). The Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations is commonly known as the Orange Book.  It lists all FDA 
approved drugs and their related patents.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (1994).  The 
FDA obtains this information from the NDA applicant.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) 
(1994). 
 58 Brown, supra note 50, at 125-26.  The FDA lists almost any patent submitted 
with the NDA in the Orange Book.  It avoids patent disputes and does not change 
the listings in the Orange Book for patents in dispute.  21 C.F.R. § 314 (1994). 
 59 Mossinghoff, supra note 51, at 192. 
 60 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1984) [hereinafter the Hatch-Waxman Act or “the Act”]. 
 61 United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 454-55 (1983). 
 62 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994). 
 63 Bioequivalence is defined as “the absence of significant difference in the rate 
and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical 
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug 
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an 
appropriately designed study.”  21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (1994).  When two compounds 
act on the body with the same strength and similar bioavailability they are 
bioequivalents.  See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(4th ed. 2000), available at http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=bioequivalent&r=67 
(on file with the author).  Thus, bioequivalent drug products are “pharmaceutical 
equivalent or pharmaceutical alternative products that display comparable 
bioavailability when studied under similar experimental conditions.”  U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug 
Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations Preface, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/ 
docs/preface/ecpreface.htm (last visited February 12, 2002) (on file with the 
author).  Bioavailability is a measure of the compounds potential for entry into the 
human receptor.  Danny D. Reible, Definition of Bioavailability, available at 
http://www.hsrc.org/hsrc/html/ssw/bioavailability.pdf (on file with the author). 
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of the approved drug, generic applicants are required only to submit 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) that relies on the 
FDA’s findings of safety and efficacy of the pioneer drug.64  This 
enables generic applicants to forego expensive clinical testing.65 
The generic applicant must provide a patent certification upon 
submission of an ANDA certifying that (i) there are no patents on the 
drug, (ii) the patent expired, (iii) the patent will expire prior to the 
date on which the generic drug will be marketed, or (iv) the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the generic version.66  The 
applicant must submit this certification for each patent on the 
pioneer drug that is listed in the Orange Book.67  Thus, under the 
Act, generic companies may seek approval of patented drugs prior to 
their patent expirations if one of the following conditions is met: 1) 
they are certifying that the patent will expire prior to the sale of the 
generic drug, 2) the patent is invalid, or 3) the patent will not be 
infringed by generic manufacture.68  Submitting a generic application 
for a drug claimed in a patent, however, is itself an act of patent 
infringement.69 
Paragraph IV certification70 requests immediate FDA approval of 
the ANDA prior to the expiration of a listed patent, and therefore, 
constitutes infringement.71  The generic company filing an ANDA 
containing paragraph IV certification must notify the patent holder 
 
 64 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Brown, supra note 50, at 129-30. 
 68 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994).  The Hatch-Waxman Act not only allows a generic 
company to file an ANDA prior to expiration of the pioneer drug patents, but it 
encourages generic companies to challenge pioneer patents by providing a 180-day 
exclusivity period to the first generic manufacturer.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) 
(1994). 
 69 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (1994). 
 70 Paragraph IV certification provides that the pioneer drug “patent is invalid or 
will not be infringed by generic manufacture, use or sale of the drug.”  21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994). 
 71 Brown, supra note 50, at 130.  “It shall be an act of infringement to submit an 
application under . . . the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . for a drug 
claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, . . . if the purpose of 
such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial 
manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of which is 
claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.”  35 U.S.C.A. § 
271(e)(2)(A) (West 1994); see also Yamanouchi v. Danbury, 231 F.3d 1339, 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that a generic company’s submission of an ANDA 
constitutes an act of infringement when the purpose of the submission is to get 
approval to market or manufacture the pioneer drug). 
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of its request.72  The patent holder may bring an infringement suit 
against the generic manufacturer based on the filing of the ANDA.73  
If the action is brought within a forty-five day period the Hatch-
Waxman Act requires that the FDA halt approval of the ANDA until 
the earlier of either the passage of thirty months or the successful 
resolution of the patent infringement suit.74 
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentive for generic 
companies to challenge a patent holder by awarding the first generic 
manufacturer to submit an ANDA a 180-day exclusivity period 
whereby it is protected from competition by subsequent generic 
applicants.75  This period begins either on the day the applicant 
commercially markets the drug or on the day a decision of a court is 
rendered holding the patent invalid or not infringed, whichever is 
earlier.76 
Some brand-name pharmaceutical companies have manipulated 
the Hatch-Waxman Act to delay generic production.77  Although the 
Act requires NDA applicants to list in the Orange Book all patents for 
an approved drug product that might be infringed upon by a generic 
company marketing the drug, it provides no mechanism for 
regulating the patents that are listed.78  When an ANDA applicant 
files paragraph IV certification claiming a listed patent to be invalid, a 
brand-name patent owner can automatically delay approval of the 
ANDA for thirty months simply by instituting an infringement action 
against the generic ANDA filer.79  Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman 
 
 72 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994). 
 73 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(2) (1994).  A patent holder has an automatic cause of 
action for infringement when a generic manufacturer certifies that a patent is invalid 
or not infringed.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii) (1994). 
 74 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994).  Under the GAAP, however, only the 
alleged infringement of patents that are listed within thirty days of the time of 
approval of the brand-name drug will trigger an automatic thirty-month stay of the 
generic.  S. Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).  Brand-name companies will 
have to obtain court ordered preliminary injunctions to delay generic approval of 
any patents listed after the thirty-day period.  Id. 
 75 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994).  Under the GAAP, however, if a generic 
and a brand-name company contract to keep the generic off the market, other 
generic companies will not be prevented from bringing their generic versions to the 
market.  S. Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).  
 76 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)-(II) (1994). 
 77 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions For Pharmaceuticals: Have They 
Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative And Legal History of U.S. Law And 
Observations For The Future, 39 J.L. & TECH. 389, 415 (1999). 
 78 Id. at 414-15.  However, under the GAAP generic companies can seek the de-
listing of frivolous patents, but listings are not otherwise regulated.  S. Res. 812, 107th 
Cong. (2002) (enacted). 
 79 Engelberg, supra note 77, at 414-15. 
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Act even allows for the NDA holder to receive this automatic thirty-
month stay of generic approval if they list a patent on the eve of 
ANDA approval.80  “Not surprisingly, the opportunity to extend 
market exclusivity by merely listing a patent in the Orange Book . . . 
encouraged brand-name drug companies to seek, obtain, and, 
ultimately list a great variety of patents of little scope or merit except 
for their ability to delay legitimate competition.”81 
The FDA approved nearly 900 new drug applications during the 
1990s.82  Approximately one third of those were for new molecular 
entities,83 while about one half were merely for new formulations or 
new combinations of already approved active ingredients.84  
Moreover, most approved drug products have more than one 
corresponding patent listed in the Orange Book and some have as 
many as five or six listed patents.85 
These efforts by the pharmaceutical giants to use patents to stop 
generic production are successful regardless of the ultimate outcome 
because, each time an action is filed, the generic version is delayed.86 
 
 80 Id.; see also Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (2001) 
(noting that merely twelve hours before Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patent on the 
administration of buspirone to treat anxiety disorders was to expire, the PTO issued 
Bristol-Myers Squibb a patent on the method of use of a metabolite produced by the 
administration of buspirone which the FDA listed in the Orange Book).  See generally 
infra PART III.  Under the GAAP brand-name pharmaceutical companies can only 
receive an automatic thirty-month stay for patents listed within thirty days of approval 
of the brand-name drug.  S. Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).  Any late listed 
patents can only be used to delay generics by receiving a preliminary injunction from 
a court.  Id. 
 81 Engelberg, supra note 77, at 415. 
 82 See NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1. 
 83 New Molecular Entities are compounds never sold before in the US.  Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Engelberg, supra note 77, at 415. 
 86 See The Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm#N_39_ (April 23, 2002) (on file with the 
author).  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act when a brand-name company brings an 
infringement suit against a generic company, it is automatically granted a thirty-
month stay during which the generic is prohibited from going to market until the 
infringement issue is resolved in the generic company’s favor.  Id.  However, if the 
GAAP passes in the House and is signed into law by President Bush, then this 
automatic thirty-month stay will only be available for patents listed in the Orange 
Book within thirty days after approval of the brand-name drug.  S. Res. 812, 107th 
Cong. (2002) (enacted).  Nevertheless, brand-name companies can still delay generic 
production under the GAAP by alleging patent infringement for patents listed in the 
Orange Book more than thirty days after the brand-name drug is approved by 
obtaining a preliminary injunction.  Id.  Any delay in generic production is likely to 
be profitable for the brand-name company.  See Steve Seidenberg, The Battle Over 
Drug Patents, 24 NAT’L. L.J. 43 (2002), available at http://www.nlj.com/special/ 
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Even if pioneer companies just delay generic production, as opposed 
to keeping generics off the market by a finding of patent validity, they 
have achieved a monopoly for that extended period. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW 
Patents alone do not turn patentees into prohibited 
monopolists.87  Nonetheless, patent holders are not immune from 
antitrust liability.88  The improper exercise of patent rights can result 
in antitrust violations.89 
A.  Basis for an Antitrust Claim and Standing to Bring an Action 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, 
attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize.90  To state a 
claim for monopolizing under Section 2, a plaintiff must show “(1) 
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the 
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.”91 The relevant market 
includes both the product market and the geographic market.92  To 
demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must show “(1) 
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive 
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous 
 
071502patents.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2002)(on file with the author).  For 
instance, while Bristol-Myers Squibb delayed the generic sales of Buspirone through 
the patent infringement suit, the company earned an estimated two million dollars a 
day in sales.  Id. 
 87 Abbot v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Professor Edmund 
Kitch argues that it is a common misconception that patents lead to an economic 
monopoly.  Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730 (2000).  Kitch suggests that the 
literature has often stated patents confer an economic monopoly on their owners, 
but that this is only a true statement if the patent claims cover the entire relevant 
market.  Id. 
 88 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 7, at 1111. 
 89 Id.  For instance, an antitrust violation can occur when a patentee knowingly 
uses fraud to obtain a patent and subsequently brings a claim for infringement of the 
fraudulently procured patent.  Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).  Another example of when a patent holder may 
violate antitrust laws is when the patentee brings an infringement suit that is a 
“sham” to interfere with a competitor’s business.  Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference 
v. Noerr Motor Freights, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). 
 90 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002). 
 91 United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
 92 Id. at 571.  In patent cases the geographic market is nationwide.  Id.  The 
determination of the product market depends on the ability of consumers to obtain 
substitute products.  Id. 
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possibility of achieving monopoly power.”93  Monopoly power is 
defined as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”94  A 
majority market share may imply the existence of monopoly power.95 
Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act96, private plaintiffs injured in 
business by violation of antitrust laws have standing to bring an 
antitrust action.97  The Federal Circuit approved the following criteria 
to determine whether a claimant possesses antitrust standing: 
(1) whether there is a causal connection between an antitrust 
violationand harm to the plaintiff and the defendants intended to 
cause that harm;(2) whether the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged 
injury was of the typethe antitrust laws were intended to forestall; 
(3) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (4) 
whether the claim rests on some abstract or speculative measure 
of harm; and (5) the strong interest in keeping the scope of 
complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable limits, 
avoiding both duplicative recoveries and the complex 
apportionment of damages.98 
Generic companies have succeeded in asserting these antitrust 
violations.  When the manufacturer of a generic form of Paclitaxel99 
filed an ANDA, Bristol-Myers Squibb, the brand-name 
pharmaceutical company, brought suit for patent infringement.100  
The generic manufacturer then filed an antitrust action against 
Bristol-Myers Squibb.101  The United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey concluded that the generic manufacturer had 
“standing to bring their Sherman Act claims.”102  The court found that 
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s infringement litigation caused the generic 
manufacturer’s injuries by preventing the generic manufacturer from 
obtaining FDA approval of its generic paclitaxel.103 
 
 93 Spectrum Sports, Inc., v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the defendant patent holders were not liable for attempted 
monopolization because there was no proof of a dangerous probability that 
defendants would monopolize a particular market and no evidence of defendants’ 
specific intent to monopolize). 
 94 Grinnel, 384 U.S. at 571 (quoting United States v. Du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 
391 (1956)). 
 95 Id. 
 96 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-19, 21-27; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2002). 
 97 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2002). 
 98 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 90 F. Supp. 2d 540, 543 (2000). 
 99 Paclitaxel is a drug used to treat cancer.  Id. at 541. 
 100 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 544-45. 
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B.  Noerr-Pennington Immunity and the Exceptions 
Even though a plaintiff may have standing to allege an antitrust 
violation, a defendant may be protected from suit by the First 
Amendment guarantees to the right to petition for legislative, 
executive, administrative or judicial action.104  Thus, where the 
alleged anticompetitive conduct arises from the initiation of an 
infringement action, a form of petitioning, the First Amendment and 
antitrust laws collide.105  The Supreme Court first articulated the 
protection from antitrust liability for anticompetitive activity that 
results from exercising the right to petition in Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,106 and United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington.107  The protection is known as Noerr-
Pennington immunity.108 
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the Sherman Act applied to the railroads’ effort 
to influence legislation.109  The railroads were campaigning for state 
laws for truck weight limits.110  The truckers alleged that the railroads 
“had conspired to restrain trade in and monopolize the freight 
business in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.”111  The Court 
found that even if the railroads’ intent was to monopolize the market, 
there was no violation of the Sherman Act because the action of 
petitioning the government is lawful.112  The Court stated that to find 
otherwise would deprive the public of the right to petition the 
government for matters in which they are interested.113  The Court 
held that the Sherman Act is not applicable to activities that are 
limited to soliciting the government because the right to petition the 
government is a right granted by the Constitution.114  Noting that 
 
 104 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 105 Raymond Ku, Antittrust Immunity, The First Amendment and Settlements: Defining 
the Boundaries of the Right to Petition, 33 IND. L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2000) (arguing that 
the right to petition is not sufficient to justify antitrust immunity). 
 106 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 107 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
 108 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. 127; see also United Mine Workers, 
381 U.S. 657. 
 109 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 129. 
 110 Id. at 131. 
 111 Id. at 129. 
 112 Id. at 139. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 145.  The Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine was articulated in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  
The First Amendment grants citizens the right to petition the government and the 
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such political activity provides the government with valuable 
information in a democratic society, the Court held that the Sherman 
Act could not be used as a means for retaliatory antitrust lawsuits filed 
in response to citizens petitioning the government.115  The Court, 
however, carved out an exception to antitrust immunity, stating that 
application of the Sherman Act to a petitioning situation that is 
merely an attempt to interfere with a competitor’s business would be 
justified.116 
Four years later in United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court 
extended antitrust immunity from petitioning the legislature to 
lobbying the executive branch.117  Large coal miners and the United 
Mine Workers persuaded the Secretary of Labor to raise the 
minimum wage and convinced the Tennessee Valley Authority to 
purchase coal only from miners paying the higher wage.118  The Court 
stated, “[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the 
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.  Such 
conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader 
scheme violative of the Sherman Act.”119  Thus, even if the sole intent 
is to eliminate competition, there is no Sherman Act violation 
because the act of petitioning the executive branch is immunized. 
Furthermore, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited,120 the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act could not 
be construed to limit access to the courts.121  California intrastate 
truckers tried to acquire operating rights while the interstate truckers 
instituted state and federal procedures before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to prevent the acquisition of those rights.122 
Explaining that the right to petition extends to all three branches of 
government, the Court extended the Noerr-Pennington immunity 
doctrine to actions that involve petitioning the courts and 
administrative agencies.123  The Court noted, however, the exception 
carved out in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference making the doctrine 
 
Sherman Act should not restrict this right.  Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. 
at 137-38.  However, there is an exception for sham petitioning.  Id. at 144. 
 115 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 137-38. 
 116 Id. at 144. 
 117 Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 657. 
 118 Id. at 660-61. 
 119 Id. at 670. 
 120 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
 121 Id.  Noerr-Pennington immunity extends to petitioning activity before 
administrative agencies and the courts.  Id. at 510-11. 
 122 Id. at 509. 
 123 Id. at 510. 
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inapplicable to litigation “that is a mere sham to cover what is actually 
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.”124  The Court concluded that “illegal 
and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or 
judicial processes” would not fall “under the umbrella of ‘political 
expression.’”125 
1.  The Sham Litigation Exception 
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc.,126 the Supreme Court defined the sham exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity.127  To show that the lawsuit is a sham, 
the antitrust plaintiff must demonstrate that the “lawsuit [is] 
objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits” and that the lawsuit was 
initiated with bad faith to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.128  The Court stated that the economic 
motivation behind bringing the suit was irrelevant because the suit 
was objectively reasonable.129  Thus, if it is shown that the suit is not 
objectively baseless, the defendant’s motivation is immaterial even if 
the motivation is to monopolize the market.130 
2.  The Walker Process Fraud Exception 
Another exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity exists when a 
party knowingly and willfully makes fraudulent representations to the 
government.131  In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & 
Chemical Corp.,132 the issue was whether “maintenance and 
enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may 
be the basis of an action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”133  The 
 
 124 Id. at 511(quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144). 
 125 California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513. 
 126 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 60-61.  Proof of sham litigation deprives the antirust defendant of Noerr-
Pennington immunity.  Id. at 61.  The plaintiff still has the burden of establishing the 
other elements of the antitrust claim.  Id. 
 129 Id. at 65-66. 
 130 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 131 Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 174-78.  The Supreme Court held that a 
party that had engaged in alleged antitrust violations through a patent infringement 
suit based on a patent obtained through fraud was not protected from antitrust 
liability by Noerr-Pennington immunity.  Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 173. 
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Supreme Court stated that if it were proved that Food Machinery 
obtained their patent through “knowing and willful 
misrepresentations to the Patent Office,” they would be subject to 
antitrust claims and the shield of Noerr-Pennington immunity would 
not longer protect them.134  Conversely, evidence of Food Machinery’s 
good faith would serve as a complete defense to the antitrust claim.135 
Thus, inappropriate use of patent rights can result in the 
violation of antitrust laws.136  Patent misuse occurs when a patent 
holder leverages his patent to obtain greater market power than 
intended by grant of the patent.137  In Walker Process Equipment, Inc., 
the Supreme Court established that engaging in patent misuse and 
obtaining a patent by fraud is a violation under Section 2.138  Patent 
misuse occurs when a patent holder brings a suit for the 
infringement of a patent that was knowingly obtained fraudulently.139 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories,140 the District 
Court of New Jersey stated that “antitrust liability under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act may arise when a patent has been procured by 
knowing and willful fraud, the patentee has market power in the 
relevant market, and has used its fraudulently obtained patent to 
restrain competition.”141  Thus, to state a claim for Walker Process 
fraud, the generic company must show that the brand-name patentee 
“1) knowingly and willfully made a fraudulent omission or 
misrepresentation; 2) with clear intent to deceive the patent 
examiner; [and] 3) the patent would not have issued but for the 
misrepresentation or omission.”142 
In Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations,143 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held “that whether conduct 
in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of 
 
 134 Id. at 177. 
 135 Id. 
 136 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 7, at 1111. 
 137 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING: FORMS AND 
ANALYSIS § 6.03(4) (2001). 
 138 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965).  The Court held that a party, who monopolizes 
the market through a patent infringement suit based on a patent that had been 
obtained through fraudulent representations to the Patent Office, could violate § 2 
of the Sherman Act if all the elements necessary to satisfy the statute were present.  
Id. at 174-78. 
 139 Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 177-78. 
 140 90 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D.N.J. 2000). 
 141 Id. at 542 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1367 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)). 
 142 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
 143 141 F.3d 1059 (1998). 
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its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of 
Federal Circuit law.”144  The court in Nobelpharma AB distinguished 
between inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud.145  Walker Process 
fraud requires a showing that there was a clear intent to deceive the 
patent examiner, and without such misrepresentation, the patent 
would not have issued.146  Inequitable conduct, however, is lesser 
misconduct that serves as a defense to a patent infringement claim 
but does not expose the patent holder to antitrust liability.147  
“[W]alker Process antitrust liability is based on the knowing assertion of 
a patent procured by fraud on the [Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO)].  [It is] very specific conduct that is clearly reprehensible.”148  
To prove Walker Process fraud there must be evidence of “a clear 
intent to deceive the examiner and thereby cause the PTO to grant 
an invalid patent.”149 
Thus, a patent holder can lose Noerr-Pennington immunity, and 
be subject to antitrust liability in two ways.150  First, if the patent was 
procured through knowing and willful fraud, and if the patent 
infringement plaintiff was aware of the fraud when bringing the suit, 
the patent holder will be striped of immunity.151  Second, “if the 
patent infringement suit was a mere sham . . . namely that it was 
objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by a desire to impose 
collateral, anti-competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable 
legal remedy” the patent infringement plaintiff will lose Noerr-
Pennington immunity.152 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  PATENT PROSECUTION TACTICS USED TO EXTEND DRUG 
MONOPOLIES 
By 2005, patents will expire on brand-name prescription drugs 
 
 144 Id. at 1068. 
 145 Id. at 1069. 
 146 Id. at 1071. 
 147 Id. at 1070. 
 148 Id. at 1071. 
 149 Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 1070. 
 150 In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
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with combined U.S. sales of approximately $20 billion.153  In order to 
protect these profits, brand-name pharmaceutical companies have 
been using patent law to extend their monopolies.154  For example, 
companies have sought patents on the purified forms of drugs 
obtained through manipulation of the compound’s molecular 
structure.155  This strategy of obtaining additional patents on specific 
features of a drug product, or a purified form of the drug, to extend 
the monopoly on a drug when the original patent is close to 
expiration is called “evergreening.”156 
“One [tactic] that has attracted increasing attention is the 
development of ‘cleaned-up’ versions of old drugs, called single 
isomers.”157  Often drugs exist in both active and inactive forms, and 
the elimination of the inactive component may increase a drug’s 
potency or reduce side effects.158  With a new patent on the single 
isomer form of a drug and large-scale advertising campaigns 
promoting the advantages of the new version, brand-name companies 
can lessen profit losses due to generic production of the old drug.159  
The FTC reviewed Eli-Lilly’s introduction of the single isomer version 
of Prozac, Prozac Jr., without finding any antitrust violations.160 
Generic companies, consumers, and the media have accused 
pharmaceutical companies of filing frivolous patents in order to 
prolong litigation.161  Under current drug-patent law, the FDA must 
halt generic approval for thirty months when there is a patent 
 
 153 NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1. 
 154 Davis, supra note 6, at 357. 
 155 NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1. 
 156 Id. 
 157 David Pilling & Richard Wolffee, Drug Abuses: As Pharmaceutical companies go to 
extraordinary lengths to protect expiring patents, regulators are starting to pay close attention, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, April 20, 2000, available at http://globalarchive.ft.com/gl. . 
./article.html?id=000420000245&query= pharmaceutical+patent (on file with the 
author). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id.  Sepracore, a company that develops Improved Chemical Entities (ICE) to 
help brand-name pharmaceutical companies battle generic manufactures, developed 
a single isomer form of Prozac.  Brian Graney, Score One for Sepracore, at 
http://www.fool.com/news/2000/sepr000413.htm (April 13, 2000) (on file with the 
author).  Prozac Jr., (R)–fluoxetine, is a single isomer form of Prozac that is more 
effective and has less side effects.  Id.  Sepracore developed and patented (R)-
fluoxetine and licensed it to Eli Lily.  Id.  Instead of completely losing their market 
share to generic manufacturers, Lily can use (R)-fluoxetine to segment the market.  
Id.  The FTC closed its investigation of Prozac Jr., finding that the introduction of the 
ICE is not anticompetitive.  Id. 
 161 Pilling & Wolffee, supra note 157.  Some patents accused of being frivolous 
have included patents on innovation in the shape or color of the pill.  Id. 
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dispute.162  Thus, a brand-name pharmaceutical company may obtain 
a “frivolous” patent on some part of drug production, drug storage, 
packaging, administration of the drug, or action in the body to delay 
generic drug production and gain extensions on their monopolies.163 
A.  Metabolite Patent 
“A metabolite is a new molecule that is created after an existing 
pharmaceutical agent breaks down in the body.”164  Some 
pharmaceutical companies have attempted to extend their patent 
protection on certain brand-name drugs by patenting the metabolite 
of the drug.  However, in Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Lehman,165 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded 
that a patent on a drug’s metabolite does not claim the drug itself.166 
The claim of the patent defines the invention and thus the patent 
owner’s property rights.167  Merely claiming the drug’s metabolite, a 
chemically distinct compound, does not claim the actual drug 
product.168  Therefore, the patent for the drug’s metabolite is not 
necessarily a patent for the actual drug. 
In a remarkable attempt to delay generic production, Bristol-
Myers Squibb received a patent on the metabolite produced by the 
breakdown of their anti-anxiety drug, BuSpar®, one day before the 
patent on the active ingredient expired.169  Under the current Hatch-
 
 162 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994). 
 163 Robert Langreth & Victoria Murphy, Perennial Patents, FORBES, Apr. 2, 2001, 
available at  http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2001/0402/052_print.html (on file with 
the author).  For example, Pfizer obtained a new patent on Neurontin, a popular 
epilepsy drug, whose patent expired in 2000.  Id.  The new patent is for “a way to 
formulate the drug to prevent degradation.”  Id.  While courts determine the validity 
of the new patent, analysts estimate Pfizer will gain another $1.5 billion in Neurontin 
sales.  Id. 
 164 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 n.6 (2001). 
 165 109 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 166 See id.  Hoechst’s patent claimed “1-hydroxy-tacrine and a method of treating 
patients in need of memory enhancement.”  Id. at 757.  1-hydroxy-tacrine is the 
metabolite formed by the break down of tacrine hydrocholoride.  Id.  The patent did 
not, however, claim tacrine hydrochloride, the active ingredient in a drug used to 
treat Alzheimer’s disease.  Id.  The court noted that Hoechst might be entitled to 
exclude others from administering tacrine hydrocholoride to patients because 
tacrine hydrochloride is metabolized into 1-hydroxy-tacrine in the body.  Id. at 759.  
See Zenith Labs v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 19 F.3d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(indicating that patent infringement may arise if the administered drug is 
metabolized in vivo into the patented product). 
 167 Hoechst-Roussel Pharm., Inc., 109 F.3d at 759. 
 168 See id. 
 169 Langreth & Murphy, supra note 163. 
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Waxman scheme,170 FDA approval of the generic production of 
BuSpar® was put on hold until it could be determined whether the 
patent was valid and whether generic production would produce the 
metabolite.171  Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that ingestion of a generic 
would produce the metabolite.172  
Bristol-Myers Squibb first patented buspirone,173 the active 
ingredient in BuSpar® for the treatment of anxiety in 1980.174  
Because FDA approval was not granted until 1986, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb received a two-year patent term extension, and thus, their 
patent was set to expire in 2000.175  Mylan Pharmaceuticals (Mylan) 
submitted an ANDA to market a generic buspirone under paragraph 
III certification,176 stating that it would not market the generic until 
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patent expired.177  It was “tentatively approved” 
with final approval contingent on expiration of the patent.178  Bristol-
Myers Squibb, however, obtained another patent on BuSpar® on the 
last day of the patent term.179  Due to the new patent, Mylan could not 
receive final approval to market its generic buspirone.180  Bristol-
Myers Squibb indicated to the FDA that the new patent was “a 
method of use patent.”181 
Mylan argued that the patent was improperly listed in the 
Orange Book because the patent did not ‘“claim the drug’ or a 
‘method of using’ the drug for which Bristol had obtained FDA 
approval,” and that the patent did not meet the requirement that “a 
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person 
not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of 
 
 170 If the GAAP was enacted into law Bristol-Myers Squibb would not receive an 
automatic thirty month stay for its late listed patent, but would have to seek a court 
ordered preliminary injunction to halt distribution of the generic.  S. Res. 812, 107th 
Cong. (2002) (enacted). 
 171 Mylan Pharm, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Buspirone is the active ingredient of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s brand-name drug 
BuSpar®, a medication used to treat generalized anxiety disorder.  Id. at 7. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 7-8. 
 176 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act generic applicants must certify that they are not 
infringing any patents by submitting an ANDA.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
(1994).  Under paragraph III certification, the generic ANDA applicant states that 
the patent(s) listed for the pioneer drug will expire on a specific date.  Id. 
 177 Mylan Pharm., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9. 
 178 Id. at 9. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id.  In a press release Bristol-Myers Squibb stated, “the [new] patent covers ‘a 
method of use of a metabolite produced by the administration of buspirone.’”  Id. 
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the drug.”182  Subsequently, the court enjoined Bristol-Myers Squibb 
to request that the FDA de-list the metabolite patent from the Orange 
Book, and the FDA was ordered to approve Mylan’s ANDA for the 
generic BuSpar®.183 
In response to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s action, Mylan and various 
other generic drug makers and purchasers of buspirone brought suit 
against Bristol-Myers Squibb claiming anticompetitive conduct 
related to the use and sale of buspirone.184  In the consolidated 
multidistrict litigation, Bristol-Myers Squibb moved to dismiss all of 
the antitrust claims.185  Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that its actions in 
listing of the buspirone metabolite patent in the Orange Book and 
bringing the subsequent patent infringement suits against the 
generic manufacturers of buspirone were protected from Sherman 
Act claims under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.186  The court found 
that Noerr-Pennington immunity did not apply to the listing of the 
buspirone patent in the Orange Book because it is not an act of 
petitioning the government.187  Because the FDA is required to 
publish submitted patent information, and thus the “FDA’s actions 
are non-discretionary and do not reflect any decision as to the validity 
of the representations in an Orange Book listing” the court 
concluded that the act does not constitute petitioning.188  The court 
further stated that Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patent infringement actions 
may fall under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, but noted that even if 
Noerr-Pennington immunity did apply, the plaintiffs’ facts were 
sufficient to establish the Walker Process fraud and “sham” litigation 
exceptions to immunity.189  The court noted, “neither the Supreme 
 
 182 Mylan Pharm, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), 
(c)(2)). 
 183 Id. at 29. 
 184 In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 185 Id. at 367. 
 186 Id. at 367-68. 
 187 Id. at 369-70. 
 188 Id. at 371. 
 189 Id. at 373.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer defrauded 
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summary judgment in favor of the generic manufacturers on patent infringement 
claims brought against them by Bristol-Myers Squibb, the court found that the 
metabolite patent does not claim buspirone, and if it did it would be invalid under 35 
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Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has addressed 
whether the Walker Process exception would apply to a fraudulent 
listing of a patent in the Orange Book along with subsequent lawsuits 
seeking to exploit the listing for anticompetitive advantage.”190  The 
Court, however, “accept[ing] the material facts alleged in the 
complaint as true and constru[ing] all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiffs’ favor,” denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on 
Noerr-Pennington immunity.191  The court found that the plaintiffs 
pled sufficient facts that, if proven, would establish Walker Process 
fraud, and that there was no objective basis for Bristol-Myers Squibb’s 
claim that the metabolite patent claimed buspirone, thus stripping 
Bristol-Myers Squibb of immunity.192 
In an analogous case, Astrazeneca, another pharmaceutical 
innovator company, sued generic companies for patent infringement 
for filing ANDAs seeking approval to market generic versions of 
Astrazeneca’s gastric acid inhibitor, Prilosec.193  The court granted 
summary judgment to the generic manufacturers.194  The court 
concluded that administration of the generic does not infringe the 
patent on the metabolite even though its active ingredient is 
converted into the metabolite in the body. 195 
Astrazeneca’s patent that covered the active ingredient of 
Prilosec, omeprazole, expired in October 2001.196  Astrazeneca, 
however, also holds a patent on “sulphenamides and the 
administration of sulphenamides for the treatment of inflammatory 
diseases of the human gastrointestinal tract” that will not expire until 
May 2005.197  Astrazeneca claimed that ingestion of the generic 
 
U.S.C. section 102(b) for violating the on sale bar.  In re: Buspirone Patent Litigation, 
185 F. Supp. 2d 340, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The on-sale bar renders unpatentable 
inventions ‘“patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States.”‘  Id. at 359 (quoting 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b)).  It is undisputed that buspirone has been sold commercially in the 
United States since 1986 as BuSpar®.  Id. at 57.  Further, Bristol-Myers Squibb even 
admitted to the PTO that its metabolite patent did not cover Buspirone.  Mylan 
Pharm., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
 190 In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 373. 
 191 Id. (quoting Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 192 Id. at 373. 
 193 In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., No. 1291, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7103, 1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2001). 
 194 Id. at 38. 
 195 Id. at 37. 
 196 Id. at 3-4. 
 197 Id. at 4.  Sulphenamides are a class of chemical compounds that are used to 
treat inflammatory diseases of the gastrointestinal tract.  In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 
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manufacturer’s omeprazole would infringe their sulphenamide 
patent because ingestion of omeprazole causes sulphenamide 
production in the body.198  The court found that “by claiming patent 
protection for sulphenamides formed in vivo after the oral 
administration of omeprazole, [Astrazeneca] has merely attempted to 
patent the unpatentable, ‘a scientific explanation for the prior art’s 
functioning.’”199  The court held that the defendants, generic 
manufacturers, did not infringe Astrazeneca’s patent on 
sulphenamide “because any claim to sulphenamides produced in vivo 
upon the oral administration of omeprazole is inherently anticipated 
by prior art.”200 
Existing case law has established that a metabolite patent does 
not claim the precursor drug from which the metabolite is formed 
when administered.201  If brand-name companies list these metabolite 
patents in the Orange Book and subsequently institute patent 
infringement actions against generic ANDA filers, the Noerr-
Penington doctrine may still shield brand-name companies from 
antitrust liability unless generics can prove that either the Walker 
Process fraud or “sham” litigation exception applies.  However, 
following the holding of In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation,202 it 
appears that generic companies may be able to meet the difficult 
standards of proving Walker Process fraud or “sham” litigation when 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies rely on metabolite patents to 
assert that generic manufacturers are infringing their brand-name 
drug patents. 
B.  Double Patenting 
Another way that pharmaceutical companies have been able to 
extend a patent term is through obviousness-type double patenting.  
Although double patenting is prohibited, if a pharmaceutical 
company is successful in obtaining a double patent it can extend its 
monopoly at least until the patent is found invalid.203  In some cases, 
delay of a generic for only a few months may result in millions more 
 
No. 1291, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 4. 
 198 Id. 
 199 In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., No. 1291, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 36 (quoting 
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (1999)).  In vivo means in the 
body, thus when sulphenamides are formed in vivo they are formed upon the 
ingestion of omeprazole. 
 200 Id. at 37-38. 
 201 Hoechst-Roussel Pharm., Inc., 109 F.3d at 759. 
 202 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 203 Seidenberg, supra note 86. 
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dollars worth of profits to a company.204 
The obvious-type double patenting doctrine is a court-made 
prohibition of patent-term extension through subsequent patent 
claims that are not distinct from claims in a prior patent.205  The court 
first analyzes the claims in both patents for differences, and then 
determines if the differences are patentably distinct.206  A subsequent 
claim that “is obvious over, or anticipated by, the earlier claim, is not 
patentably distinct and thus invalid for obvious-type double 
patenting.”207 
Barr Laboratories (“Barr”) filed an ANDA with paragraph IV 
certification for fluoxetine hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Eli 
Lilly & Co.’s (“Lilly”) antidepressant drug Prozac.208  Lilly brought a 
subsequent infringement action alleging that Barr infringed Lilly’s 
patents for the drug.209  Barr argued that Lilly’s second patent, which 
would have extended its monopoly for three extra years, was invalid 
for double patenting.210  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
agreed and held that the patent was invalid for obviousness-type 
double patenting.211 
The earlier Lilly patent claimed “a method for treating anxiety 
in a human by administering an effective amount of fluoxetine or a 
pharmaceutically-acceptable salt thereof,” and the second patent 
claimed “a method of blocking the uptake of serotonin by brain 
neurons in animals by administering the compound fluoxetine 
hydrochloride.”212  The court found that people ordinary skilled in 
the art know “that fluoxetine hydrochloride is a pharmaceutically-
acceptable salt of fluoxetine.”213  Furthermore, all evidence 
demonstrated that “blocking serotonin uptake by use of fluoxetine 
hydrochloride is an inherent characteristic of the administration of 
fluoxetine hydrochloride for any purpose, including the treatment of 
 
 204 When Bristol-Myers Squibb was able to delay the generic version of BuSpar® in 
only several months they earned $200 million in profits on the sale of the brand 
name drug.  Bitter Medicine, supra note 10. 
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anxiety.”214  Because the second patent described the method through 
which fluoxetine hydrochloride worked, it was not patentably distinct 
from the prior patent.215 
In March of 2000, SmithKline Beecham216 (“SmithKline”) 
obtained an additional patent on Augmentin®, U.S. Patent Nos. 
6,218,380 (the “380 patent”), potentially extending its monopoly on 
the antibiotic until 2017.217  SmithKline holds the patent on the active 
ingredient, amoxycilin.218  The newly granted U.S. patent covers 
additional features of the drug such as an acid that inhibits 
degradation of the active ingredient.219  Teva Pharmaceuticals, a 
generic drug manufacturer, sought summary judgment alleging that 
its proposed generic would not infringe SmithKline’s 380 patent 
because the patent is invalid on the grounds of obviousness-type 
double patenting.220  The court found that the 380 patent appears to 
be a rewording of the previous patent, U.S. Patent Number 4,529,720 
(the “720 patent”), and thus, the two patents are not patentably 
distinct.221  Therefore, the court invalidated the 380 patent for 
obvious type double patenting.222 
Although a finding of obvious-type double patenting will render 
invalid a patent that is not patentably distinct from an earlier patent, 
a brand-name company that succeeds in obtaining a double patent 
will have extended its monopoly under the current Hatch-Waxman 
scheme by halting FDA approval of a generic ANDA until the patent 
is found to be invalid.223  If brand-name companies list these double 
patents in the Orange Book and subsequently institute patent 
infringement actions against generic ANDA filers, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine may shield the brand-name companies from 
antitrust liability unless the generics can succeed at proving Walker 
Process fraud or “sham” litigation.224 
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C.  Polymorph Patent 
Pharmaceutical compounds may crystallize in different forms 
called polymorphic forms.225  Some pharmaceutical companies have 
attempted to extend their patent protection on certain drugs by 
patenting the polymorphs of those drugs.226 
Glaxo alleged that generic production of Zantac®, an anti-ulcer 
medication by Novopharm, would infringe its patents on ranitidine 
hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Zantac®.227  Glaxo has three 
patents on ranitidine hydrochloride, which crystallizes into two 
distinct forms.228  The patent that “discloses a method of making 
ranitidine hydrochloride and claims the compound per se” expired 
in July 1997.229  Glaxo scientists later discovered that ranitidine 
hydrochloride crystallizes into a form preferable to the first known 
crystalline form, which was referred to as Form 1.230  They called the 
new form Form 2.231  Form 2 and the process for making Form 2 were 
patented in two separate patents that would expire in 2002 and 2004, 
respectively.232  Novopharm filed an ANDA in 1991 seeking to market 
Form 2.233  Glaxo brought suit against Novopharm for infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), but Novopharm challenged the validity 
of the Form 2 patent.  Novopharm alleged the original patent 
disclosed the method of making ranitidine hydrochloride and 
claimed the compound anticipated the Form 2 patent’s claims.234  
The district court, however, rejected Novopharm’s “anticipation 
defense.”235 
In 1994, Novopharm filed another ANDA to market Form 1 
certifying that it would not infringe the Form 2 patent, and it did not 
intend to market Form 1 until the Glaxo patent expired.236  Glaxo 
sued Novopharm for infringement of its patent on the process of 
 
 225 Allen G. Mitchell, Racemic Drugs: Racemic Mixture, Racemic Compound, or 
Pseudoracemate?, J. PHARMACY & PHARM. SCI., available at http://www.ualberta.ca/~csps 
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making Form 2.237  Novopharm’s ANDA permitted the product “to 
have a Form 1 [ranitidine hydrochloride] purity as low as 90%” with 
impurities that may include Form 2.238 
Glaxo, however, was not able to establish that Novopharm’s 
Form 1 ranitidine hydrochloride generic would contain Form 2.239  
Thus, the court found that “Glaxo failed to prove that Novopharm’s 
product would contain Form 2 ranitidine hydrochloride . . . [and] 
also failed to prove that Novopharm was using a process claimed in 
the [Form 2 process] patent.”240 
Nonetheless, it appears that patenting different polymorphic 
forms of patented drugs may be a legitimate way for brand-name 
companies to extend their monopolies.241  If brand-name companies 
can establish that generic manufacturers are producing drugs that 
contain the patented polymorphs they can prohibit generics from 
producing these drugs because doing so would constitute 
infringement.242  A generic manufacturer, however, may produce a 
generic version of a drug in a polymorphic form for which the patent 
has expired.243 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Patent “evergreening” is a popular practice among brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies.  Still, the unclear distinction between 
brand-name companies’ aggressive, pro-active behavior and anti-
competitive behavior can lead to antitrust challenges by generic 
companies and the federal government.244 
Generic pharmaceutical companies sued for patent 
infringement for filing ANDAs will likely have standing to bring 
claims against their brand-name challengers under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  Generic manufacturers can assert that the brand-name 
companies violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing or 
attempting to monopolize the market for their brand-name drugs.245  
Generics can allege that the brand-name companies achieved 
 
 237 Id. 
 238 Glaxo, Inc., 110 F.3d at 1564. 
 239 Id. at 1571. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Peter O. Safir, Current Issues in the Pioneer Versus Generic Drug Wars, 50 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 335, 335 (1995), available at http://www.fdii.org/pubs (on file with the 
author). 
 245 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
 2003 COMMENT 507 
monopoly power in the market for their drugs because of their 
predominant market share.246  Generics can also assert that the brand-
name companies violated Section 2 by willfully seeking to maintain 
their monopoly power.247 
Under the Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine, however, 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies are likely to be immune from 
Sherman Act Section 2 claims for bringing patent infringement suits 
against generic companies who file ANDAs.  Patents are presumed 
valid for the duration of the lawsuit until invalidated by the court.248  
Therefore, brand-name companies are operating within the rights 
granted to them through grant of the patent.  Under the patent 
grant, brand-name companies have the right to exclude generics 
from producing and selling their patented drugs.249  Because the 
brand-name companies have patent protection, the lawsuits alleging 
patent infringement are unlikely to be found to be objectively 
baseless and thus, generics will not be able to successfully allege the 
“sham” litigation exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. 
Generic companies can allege that brand-name companies have 
committed Walker Process fraud by using fraud to procure their 
patents.  Nevertheless, generic companies will face challenges in 
showing that the brand-name patentee “1) . . . knowingly and willfully 
made a fraudulent omission or misrepresentation; 2) with clear 
intent to deceive the patent examiner; 3) where the . . .  ‘patent 
would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission.’” 250 
It is clear that brand-name companies have used the clause in 
the Hatch-Waxman Act requiring the FDA to freeze approval of a 
generic ANDA for thirty months or until the patent infringement suit 
is resolved in court to delay generic production and extend their 
monopolies on money-making drugs.251  The Greater Access to 
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act (“GAAP”) purports to close this 
loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act by removing the thirty-month 
statutory preliminary injunction for any drug patent listed in the 
Orange Book more than thirty days after approval of the brand-name 
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drug.252  The GAAP was passed in the Senate on July 31, 2002.253  
Under the GAAP, in the case of late listed patents, brand-name 
companies can seek a court-granted preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the applicant from engaging in the commercial 
manufacture or sale of the drug until the court decides the issues of 
patent validity and infringement.254 
Elimination of the thirty-month injunction, however, is not likely 
to be enough to halt any anti-competitive behavior.  A presumption 
of validity is given to patents and the burden is on the challenger of 
the patent to show that a patent is invalid by clear and convincing 
evidence.255  Furthermore, courts grant preliminary injunctions 
against alleged patent infringers when (1) it is reasonably likely that 
the patent holder will be successful on the merits, (2) there is a 
possibility of irreparable harm, (3) the balancing of hardships faced 
by the parties weighs in the patent holders favor, and (4) the 
injunction will not likely have an adverse impact on the public 
interest.256  Further, “it is often assumed that infringement of a valid 
patent would result in irreparable harm.”257  Thus, it is likely that 
removal of the thirty-month statutory injunction will not remedy the 
existing situation because brand-name pharmaceutical companies 
can still delay generic production with the grant of a preliminary 
injunction by merely making a showing to the court that the patent 
could be valid. 
The Federal Circuit gives great weight to patent holders.  Patents 
are presumed valid and patent invalidity can only be demonstrated 
with clear and convincing evidence.258  The patent process, however, 
is ex parte; the company seeking the patent provides the 
information.259  Also, patent examiners do not spend a lot of time 
reviewing applications and prior art, and often miss relevant prior 
art.260  The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) approves 
approximately seventy-percent of the massive amount of patent 
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applications it reviews.261  The PTO should revise its procedures so 
that close scrutiny is given to all patent applications.  The PTO 
should also take competition into account when reviewing 
applications and frivolous applications should be denied.  In 
addition, a more careful analysis should be given to the review of any 
application and all relevant prior art when an applicant seeks to 
obtain an additional patent on a pharmaceutical product that would 
extend the initial patent holders’ monopoly beyond the expiration of 
the original patent.  Therefore, PTO procedures should be reviewed 
in an attempt to increase competition and deter pharmaceutical 
companies from engaging in anti-competitive behavior by 
manipulating intellectual property rights. 
In addition, the Orange Book alone provides an opportunity for 
a brand-name drug patent holder to extend its market exclusivity.262  
There are no guidelines for listing patents in the Orange Book and 
no mechanism for removing them.263  Thus, the Orange Book itself 
encourages brand-name pharmaceutical companies to procure 
frivolous patents. Guidelines for regulating listings in the Orange 
Book should be established to prevent the listing of frivolous 
patents.264  Such guidelines should provide specifically for any listing 
that extends a brand-name pharmaceutical company’s monopoly 
beyond the expiration of the initial patent to be scrutinized. 
Furthermore, any new legislation should impose a meaningful 
penalty upon companies that are found to have deliberately 
forestalled generic production by filing frivolous patents.  Under the 
current scheme even if a frivolous patent is subsequently found 
invalid, the patent holder will have successfully forestalled generic 
production, at least until the infringement suit is determined.  With 
some blockbuster drugs generating approximately $1,100,000 per day 
per drug,265 the present system provides a mechanism for anti-
competitive behavior where economic incentive clearly exists. 
CONCLUSION 
Patients’ rights groups argue that these extensions of drug 
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patents hurt consumers and the health care system by creating 
monopolies.  Pharmaceutical companies, however, are using the 
current United States patent laws to obtain these patents.  Further, 
patent law is designed to promote scientific research and innovation 
and these patents are being used to develop innovative prescription 
drugs that will ultimately benefit patients.  Although both sides have 
strong policy arguments, it appears that the current scheme favors 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies by allowing them to use 
loopholes in the laws to extend their patent terms, while protecting 
them from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
